Six years after Félix Tshisekedi’s improbable rise to the presidency, the Democratic Republic of Congo stands at a precarious intersection.
His re-election in December 2023 reaffirmed democratic continuity, yet the DRC’s deeper currents of armed violence, institutional decay, and resource exploitation continue to churn just beneath the surface.
Tshisekedi’s second term arrives with both renewed legitimacy and entrenched burdens. The UN peacekeeping force MONUSCO is drawing down after 25 years, leaving behind a security vacuum in the east. Meanwhile, the global race for green energy minerals has pushed Congo’s cobalt reserves into the geopolitical spotlight. But in a nation where wealth is often a curse, not a cure, can this opportunity be seized without repeating the past?
Between Ballot and Backroom
Félix Tshisekedi’s ascent in 2019 marked the DRC’s first peaceful transfer of power since independence. But the election was marred by widespread allegations of a secret pact with outgoing President Joseph Kabila. Martin Fayulu, the opposition’s consensus candidate, labelled it “an electoral coup.” Still, Tshisekedi was sworn in and has since consolidated power by dismantling Kabila’s hold over parliament and the judiciary.
In the 2023 polls, Tshisekedi clinched 73% of the vote, defeating 25 challengers in an election that international observers called “logistically flawed but mostly peaceful.” His coalition, the Sacred Union, now dominates the legislature. Yet, behind this political theatre, the real battles of corruption, conflict, and reform remain unfinished business.
A Governance Quagmire in a Land of Plenty
Despite sitting atop an estimated 70% of the world’s cobalt and vast reserves of coltan, copper, and lithium, the DRC ranked 180 out of 191 countries on the 2024 Human Development Index. Transparency International still places it among the world’s most corrupt nations.
President Tshisekedi has trimmed his bloated cabinet and championed the digitisation of public services. In July 2025, his administration launched a transparency portal for mining contracts, a nod to investor scrutiny. But critics argue reform is slow and largely symbolic.
“The DRC’s problem isn’t a lack of vision. It’s a surplus of vested interests,” says Dr. Modeste Mbuyu, an economist at the University of Lubumbashi.
Much like trying to purify water from a poisoned well, each anti-corruption measure often reveals a deeper rot beneath.
A Conflict That Refuses to End
North Kivu and Ituri remain in the grips of nearly 120 armed groups, according to the Kivu Security Tracker. These militias, some with cross-border roots dating back to the Rwandan genocide, control mining sites, extort local populations, and clash with government forces.
In 2025, MONUSCO began its phased withdrawal scheduled to end in December amid escalating violence. In Goma and Beni, locals fear abandonment.
“It’s like watching the rain clouds go while the storm is still here,” says Esther Lumbala, a displaced teacher in South Kivu.
Despite increased military cooperation with Uganda and Rwanda, trust remains fragile. Rwanda is accused of backing the M23 rebels, while Kinshasa continues to expel Rwandophone officials in retaliation.
Caption:
This choropleth map visualises the concentration of armed group activity across the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 2024 to 2025. Provinces including North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri exhibit the highest density of armed militias primarily composed of factions such as the M23, ADF, Mai-Mai, and CODECO. These regions remain epicentres of conflict, displacement, and mineral exploitation despite ongoing military operations and international peacekeeping presence. Areas shaded in dark red indicate very high militia density, while light red zones denote moderate to low activity.
Data Source:
Kivu Security Tracker, UN Group of Experts Reports (2024–2025), Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), UN MONUSCO Situation Briefs.
A Crisis Beyond the Headlines
The DRC has over 6.9 million internally displaced persons, the highest in Africa, according to UNHCR’s 2025 mid-year report. Ebola has re-emerged in Equateur province, while cholera outbreaks have surged in overcrowded IDP camps. In June 2025, UNICEF warned that 15 million Congolese children are facing acute malnutrition.
“The DRC is one of the world’s most overlooked humanitarian catastrophes,” notes Jean-Paul Cavalieri, UNHCR’s country representative.
While global aid flows have improved marginally, reaching $680 million in 2024, funding gaps persist. Logistics remain a nightmare: one in five health zones is inaccessible due to poor roads or insecurity.
Economic Opportunities or Resource Curse Redux?
With cobalt dubbed “the new oil,” the DRC sits at the heart of the clean energy revolution. China remains the dominant player, controlling over 60% of cobalt refining. But new entrants like the UAE’s Primera Group and U.S.-backed consortia have secured significant stakes since 2023.
Still, the IMF notes that only 6% of mining revenue trickles into public investment. In rural provinces, roads remain impassable, and schools are mud structures with no teachers.
“We are sitting on a gold mine but eating cassava leaves,” laments Pastor Nguvu Ndembo, a civil society leader in Kasai.
Caption:
This chart illustrates the inverse relationship between the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining revenues and its national poverty index between 2009 and 2024. While mining revenues driven by exports of cobalt, copper, and coltan have steadily increased, the poverty index has declined at a slower pace. The visual highlights the paradox of extractive growth in a fragile governance environment: wealth generation has not yet translated into proportional poverty reduction, exposing persistent inequalities and structural bottlenecks in revenue redistribution.
In June 2025, the government signed a new minerals infrastructure deal with China worth $7.3 billion. It pledges road, rail, and dam projects, but watchdog groups caution that past deals were opaque and underdelivered.
Diplomatic Strategy in a Geopolitical Storm
Tshisekedi has ramped up regional diplomacy, reviving the dormant Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and hosting summits with Angola, Tanzania, and Kenya. A new trilateral agreement with Uganda and South Sudan aims to boost cross-border trade and security cooperation.
Yet, relations with Rwanda remain frosty. Accusations of meddling, militia sponsorship, and proxy warfare continue to poison bilateral ties.
Meanwhile, the West walks a tightrope. Washington recently renewed sanctions on DRC generals accused of war crimes, but simultaneously pledged $200 million in green infrastructure funding. Brussels supports election capacity-building but warns of “democratic backsliding.”
Caption:
This infographic visualises the geographic spread and proportional influence of Chinese and UAE investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining sector between 2020 and 2025. The map uses colour shading to represent zones of dominant influence—deep red for Chinese-backed operations and orange for UAE-led interests—across key mineral-rich provinces such as Lualaba, Haut-Katanga, and Tanganyika. Key sites like Kolwezi, Tenke, and Deziwa highlight anchor concession areas, while the pie chart reflects the overwhelming investment share held by Chinese firms (73%) compared to UAE entities (27%).
Implications and What to Watch
The DRC’s trajectory will ripple far beyond its borders. Its minerals are vital to the global energy transition. Its instability fuels refugee flows into Uganda, Zambia, and Angola. And its political evolution will test Africa’s democratic durability.
What to monitor:
- Final phase of MONUSCO withdrawal (Dec 2025)
- Implementation of Chinese and UAE infrastructure deals
- Cobalt price volatility and its impact on exports
- Resurgence or reintegration of M23 and ADF militias
As Tshisekedi embarks on a second term, the DRC remains a nation of immense promise entangled with historical trauma. Whether it becomes a keystone in Africa’s economic awakening or remains a cautionary tale of squandered wealth will depend on what happens next.
“Congo is not a failed state,” says Congolese historian Chantal Kalume. “It is a hijacked one still waiting for its rightful pilot.”
